Books by members

Book Reviews

Choices and Illusions: How Did I Get Where I Am, and How Do I Get Where I Want To Be?

Eldon Taylor, PhD, FAPA

In his best-selling book, Choices and Illusions, Taylor applies the same approach he uses as a deception-discovering criminalist to unravel human behavior. In Choices and Illusions, Taylor reveals the thoughts behind the behavior when people are doing what they want to do and when they are doing what they don’t want to do. But most significantly, he teaches that it is never too late to be happy and successful, regardless of the past.

Countless case studies detail how attitude pervasively affects every aspect of life. Reading this best-selling book will open a new realm of possibilities for readers who translate the message into life action. Taylor exposes false illusions, and replaces them with simple teachings to help each reader reach his or her highest potential. Choices and Illusions tells the story of one man’s journey into the workings of the human mind and raison d’etre [reason for being].

Eldon Taylor has made a lifelong study of the human mind and has earned doctoral degrees in psychology and metaphysics. He is a Fellow with the American Psychotherapy Association and a nondenominational minister. Taylor is both president and director of Progressive Awareness Research, Inc.

Healing Parents: Helping Wounded Children Learn to Trust & Love

Michael Orlans, MA, DAPA, and Terry M. Levy, PhD, DAPA

Learn to change the dynamics in your relationship with your child through developing secure attachments. Healing Parents gives parents and caregivers the information, tools, support, self-awareness, and hope they need to help a child heal emotional wounds and improve behaviorally, socially, and morally. This book is a toolbox filled with practical strategies and research that will help parents and caregivers understand their child, learn to respond in a constructive way, and create a healthy environment.

Michael Orlans, MA, DAPA, DABFE, is a Certified Master Therapist with more than 32 years of clinical experience working with children, adults, and families in public mental health, the criminal justice system, and private practice. A pioneer in the treatment of children, adolescents, and adults with compromised attachment, he is the developer of Corrective Attachment Therapy and innovator of the two-week intensive treatment approach. He is a Diplomate of the American Psychotherapy Association, and a Fellow of the American College of Forensic Examiners.

Terry M. Levy, PhD, DAPA, DABFE, DABPS, has been a psychotherapist, trainer, supervisor, and consultant for over thirty years. Dr. Levy is a Licensed Clinical Psychologist in both Colorado and Florida, and a Diplomate and Master Therapist of the American Psychotherapy Association. Dr. Levy is the editor of Handbook of Attachment Interventions (2000, Elsevier Press).

Book Review: Trials and Tribulations

To purchase this book, please go to Amazon.com

Book Description

Medical malpractice has become a hot issue in our litigious society. The trial lawyers are locked in battle with the doctors, while the politicians and the patients look on. This is about one skirmish in that battle, told by one of the casualties.

Donald Austin, M.D., was a well-respected neurosurgeon, operating at the cutting edge of medical technology. He was justly regarded as an expert in the field, and as such gave testimony for the defense in many malpractice lawsuits. However, he was shocked by some instances of malpractice, and when he decided to testify for plaintiffs as well, he did not bargain for what ensued. As his testifying became known, both his professional colleagues and the medical societies carried out a smear campaign that ended his professional career.

About the Author

Donald Austin, M.D., is a third-generation doctor. A native of Indiana, he now lives in Michigan. He was chief of the neurosurgery section of the Hutzel Hospital in Detroit for many years and associate professor of neurosurgery at Wayne State University. He is married, with four grown children, and is now, reluctantly, retired.

There is no such thing as a small fire. Fire knows no boundaries and adheres to no restrictions. It is limited only by its supply of oxygen and the availability of a fuel source. Someone can set a small and insignificant fire, but fires only start small. They can fizzle out and die, but all too often they grow, vast and terrible. They destroy property. They take lives.

Sadly, the most persistent and dangerous incendiary fire-setters are the weakest and least responsible of us all: children. According to the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety, juveniles in the United States annually set 41,900 fires that result in 165 deaths, 1,900 injuries, and $272 million in property damage. Fifty-five percent of all arson arrests in the United States are children under the age of 18, nearly half of whom are under the age of 15, and 6.8% of whom are younger than 10 years old. Who are these children, and why do they set fires?

A 3-year-old innocently playing with a cigarette lighter left out by a careless parent might cause a conflagration in which his entire family dies. A 10-year-old might ignite his mattress in a desperate attempt to draw attention to an intolerable home situation. A high school student might throw a match into a wastebasket so that an alarm will go off and disrupt a dreaded test. One teenager might set fire to a car. Another might set fire to a rival’s home. Some have even been known to toss flammable liquids on derelicts because it amused them to watch the wretched souls flailing frantically at flames and screaming in pain. A successful actress I once knew told me that as a child, she had set fires for emotional relief. Children set fires out of boredom, anger, and rage. The motivations of youthful fire-setters run the gamut from curiosity to pathology, from innocence to evil.

Recently, I received a letter from a special education teacher, whom I will call Sarah Nelson, who works for the New York City school system. Her letter began:

Dear Shelly,

Gerald, who is repeating third grade, did so well that I was wondering WHY he had been placed in my class until, following a real fire evacuation at about 11 o’clock that morning (after someone had set the paper towel dispenser in the boys’ bathroom ablaze), I was called into the principal’s office.

There sat Gerald, two other boys, and his teacher.

“Mrs. Nelson,” asked the principal. “Was Gerald with you between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m. today?”

“Yes. He was taking the assessment test.”

“Did Gerald leave you at any time to use the bathroom?”

In the 47 seconds or so that Gerald had taken “to relieve himself,” he had pulled out a purloined lighter from his pocket and lit up the paper towels.

And this was not his first fire of the day!

A few hours before, Gerald, in the presence of the other two boys sitting in the principal’s office, had used matches to light up a toilet paper roll!

In the case of the paper towels, one of the male teachers had happened by, saw flames coming from the dispenser, rushed to the science room where there were two buckets filled with water, and attacked the fire. It was then that smoke had come pouring out of the bathroom and the alarm had been sounded.

Dismayed as I was to hear about these fires, it was not until I had read the next paragraph that I changed my mind about how I was going to approach this subject:

Of course, we did not DARE disturb the fire department to check our suppression efforts and/or “light” into the student body about fire safety. And our principal refuses to let us cover the incident in our student newspaper. It is for this reason I thought of you and wondered if you could give me some tips about juvenile fire-setters.

Needless to say, the small, unreported fires in Sarah’s school did not loom in my mind as small. I saw them as the deadly conflagrations that they might so easily have become. To alert my friend to the seriousness of her situation, I related some frightening statistics accumulated in the spring of 2004 by the Massachusetts Coalition for Kids in Danger. The Coalition’s purpose was to track media coverage of children who set fires or set off bombs.

In the first 201 days of the project, children burned over 57 vehicles, set fires that destroyed over 48,594 acres of forest, set 218 houses on fire, and destroyed 228 apartments, 30 businesses, and 13 churches. Additionally, they killed 80 people (26 of whom were children who perished in fires that they, themselves, had set) and injured 346 people, including 63 firefighters, police officers, and bomb technicians. Relative to institutions of learning, in its first 7 months of information gathering, the study found that 301 or 31% of the 901 fires set by children had targeted schools. These statistics, however, reflect only fires that were reported in the media. If we could add in fires like those described to me by Sarah Nelson—ones left unreported because principals do not want their schools to look bad—the statistics would become ominous indeed.

My involvement with juvenile fire-setters began when a polygraph expert contacted my late husband and me. He had been hired by a drug rehabilitation facility that I will call Kid City (my version of Boys Town) to determine which of the young people on the premises was responsible for setting a series of fires. Because there were hundreds of suspects and the polygraphist could not possibly test them all, he suggested that Kid City hire us. Our company, Charles G. King Associates, investigates the origin and cause of fires (origin: where a fire started; cause: what or who initiated the blaze).

At that time, most of the high school-aged children in Kid City had either been remanded there by the courts or had been placed there by family members or guardians for drug rehabilitation. The greatest percentage of those in the facility were criminals, and some were hardened criminals. All were underage. Their ages were relevant because Kid City was mandated by law to maintain the absolute confidentiality of their juvenile population. This meant that, although the local fire department could be called in to fight a fire, after extinguishment, they were required to leave. Nor would a city, county, or state fire marshal be permitted to enter the building to analyze the fire scene, search for hidden stashes of matches, or interview the residents.

This left Kid City in a terrible bind because at least one of their residents had set a series of fires, but, unlike the public school system situation related to me by Sarah Nelson, Kid City was completely committed to the continued safety of the young people in its charge. This is why they brought us in to investigate the fires. First, Charlie and I were asked to sign documents protecting the confidentiality of the residents (all of the names and places in this article have been changed); then we were briefed.

Kid City was located about 2 hours north of a big eastern city. The four-story structure was slightly larger than a county hospital, and it was surrounded by acres of beautiful farmland where residents were encouraged to grow crops and take nature walks. Other than some pleasant administrative offices on the ground floor and an elegant wood-paneled religious sanctuary, the building itself was institutional and utilitarian: cinderblock classrooms, cinderblock dormitory, communal dining rooms, and so on.

During our briefing by the director of Kid City, we were told that over the past seven months, three fires had occurred:

1. February 28 –Someone had taken a bunch of papers, piled them in a bin in the basement of Kid City, and ignited them. The fire was set at 8:20 a.m.
2. July 13 –Someone had shoved a wad of toilet paper between the arm and cushion of a sofa and set it on fire. This fire had not occurred at Kid City proper, but at its induction facility over 50 miles south. The fire had been discovered a little after midnight.
3. August 14 – This fire was set between two mattresses stored in the cinderblock closet of an empty room on the fourth floor of Kid City where the kids used to “coop,” or hang out. The fire occurred at 6:57 p.m.

We were called in after the third fire. Initially, the task of discovering who had set these fires was daunting, in no small part because our pool of suspects was upward of 150 residents. We then had to multiply this pool by three (once for each fire). In order to cut the list down to a manageable size, we asked the administrators to go through their files and give us only the names of those residents who had been at Kid City for at least the last two and optimally for all three of the fires. This reduced our pool to a little over one hundred suspects. To whittle the list down further, we drafted an affidavit and had copies distributed to the 100 plus residents on the list, as well as to all of the counselors, teachers, and administrators in Kid City.

The affidavit asked the individual to write his or her name and to answer four questions about each of the three fires. The questions were carefully worded to make the respondents feel that they were only reporting their observations, and not being tattletales or informants. It was not their job to identify the fire setter, it was ours. The four questions were

1. Where were you at the time of the fire?
2. What were you doing?
3. Who did you see?
4. Who saw you?

After the forms had been filled out, they were returned to us. Once we had a chance to look them over, we realized, somewhat to our surprise, that not only had the residents been willing to answer our questions, they had done so eagerly. We also noticed that fear of injury or death superseded peer group loyalty. The teenagers in the facility had a firm grasp of how dangerous a fire could be. Most of the students had been in residence only for the fires that had occurred in Kid City and made no mention of the fire at the induction facility. Many gave detailed observations that specified locations, recalled times, and named names. What follows is a sampling of typical responses:

Richard C.

During the first fire I was with my clan leader Evelyn V. talking about my problems. Then I went to seminar at 1:00 o’clock.

During the second fire I was in the rec room relating with Margaret C. Rene D., Dave H., Todd M., Marty E., and Jerome L.

Ken B.

First Fire – I was eating lunch until approx. 12:45. Then I went down to the auditorium for seminar. I do not remember who I was with at the time. Evelyn V. was going to give the seminar. I was reading until the fire began. At approx. 1:05 the alarm went off and I went outside.

Second Fire – I was in the recreation room, listening to music with Donald A., Joe Z., Joe B., and one other person. At approx. 9:30 I went upstairs to my room, and was still there when the alarm went off. When I was leaving the floor during the alarm, Bill D., saw me on the floor.

From these responses, we extrapolated where people were, when they were there, what they were doing, whom they saw, and who saw them. Then we tediously cross-referenced times, places, and residents. If Donna wrote that she had seen Thomas, Iris, and Edwin in the basement, we wanted to know if Thomas, Iris, and Edwin had also seen Donna. Our ultimate goal was to identify who had been in the area of the various fire scenes at the times of the fire and who had not.

The work was time-consuming and required meticulous attention to detail, but it produced results. Once we had completed and studied our charts, we were able to eliminate all but four suspects: Chris Ramirez, Fred Pozniak, Tyrell Washington, and Randy Scarp.

Chris Ramiriz

• Chris Ramirez had been seen on the fourth floor immediately before the fire.
• When the alarm went off, he was overheard saying that there were mattresses in room 411 that would be easy to set on fire.
• He was seen smoking a cigarette on the fourth floor immediately prior to the fire.
• He had set two fires before he was 6 years old. One in his grandfather’s garbage and one in his father’s grocery store. Coincidentally, the pizza store next door to his father’s grocery store had also burned down.

Fred Pozniak

• Fred Pozniak was seen on the fourth floor shortly before the fire.
• He was moody, quiet, and used to hang out on the mattresses in the “fire room.”
• He was a bed wetter and claimed to have been an abused child.
• He was a loner and was picked on and teased for being unattractive.
• He was very grim and depressed on the day of the fire.

Tyrell Washington

• Tyrell Washington had told two other boys at Kid City that he had a prior arrest for arson that was not in his records.
• He was present for all three fires.
• He had a hostile attitude and was overheard threatening to blow up the building.

Randy Scarp

• Randy Scarp wanted to leave Kid City and hated the place.
• He was reported to have a sadistic streak and laughed when other people were in pain.
• He seemed to have no control over his emotions.
• He was heard stating that “people are going to start dropping” at Kid City.
• Many of the other residents thought that he was not really a drug addict, but that he was crazy.

Once our list had become manageable, we moved to the next phase of our investigation. This was to interview each suspect individually and ask him what he had seen, when and where he had seen it, and who he thought had set the fires. Our interview strategy was low-key. Each youngster would be brought into a private room, asked questions, and invited to respond at length. None of the interviews were tape-recorded. Nobody from the staff was present. Charlie and I took turns asking questions, and I took all the notes.

After we had finished our interviews, we created four final charts, one for each suspect. Each consisted of three columns. The first column was headed “Witness” and listed the names of the residents who had seen one of the four main suspects at the time of a fire. The Second column was headed “What clears him” and delineated what the witness had seen that seemed to exculpate the suspect. The third column, headed “What makes him look suspicious,” did the same for what made him look guilty.

The following might be a typical entry for Tyrell Washington:

• Witness—Bill Hix
• What clears him— Bill saw Tyrell in the courtyard after dinner.
• What makes him look suspicious—Tyrell was present for all three fires and is known to have a hostile attitude. He told Bill and at least two other kids that he had been arrested for arson prior to coming to Kid City. Bill also overheard Tyrell threatening to blow up a building.

Our analysis of the entries on these four charts made it evident that only Randy Scarp had been sighted by multiple witnesses in the areas of all three fires. The “conclusion” column on his chart read:

Randy Scarp is the only suspect who was confirmed to be on the fourth floor at the time of the fire and who admits to being there. He denies setting the fire, but cannot explain why he did not see who did, because he was in the hall at the time the fire was set. There is also a problem with his disposal of a cigarette he was smoking at the time, as he said that he tossed it out a window, but that window is covered with a screen.

At the interview, he presented himself as compassionate and good-natured. He said he did not resent being accused of setting the fire, that he was not angry, and that he had not been out to get anybody lately.

The most suspicious thing about Randy, other than his proximity to both fires, is the benign way in which he presented himself. This benevolence is in complete contrast to the way others describe him. Also, unlike the others who were interviewed, at the end of his interview, we felt that Randy gave an audible sigh of relief that it was over.

After we had finished our interviews, our charts, and our analyses, we told the Kid City director that we had eliminated three of our four prime suspects and that we believed Randy Scarp, alone, had set all three fires. He responded that they were going to polygraph all four boys.

Subsequently, the polygraphist told us that Randy Scarp was, and I quote from my notes, “heavy duty guilty.”

Nevertheless, all four boys were kicked out. Charlie and I may have cleared Chris Ramirez, Fred Pozniak, and Tyrell Washington of involvement in those specific incendiary incidents, but Kid City was not going to take any chances. Fire is too dangerous, and too many lives were at stake. They knew, as we do, that children who set fires are a fact of reality, an unfortunate fact brought home to me when my friend, Sarah Nelson, contacted me again—this time on a cell phone from her classroom. After a minute or two, I had calmed her down enough to learn that two more fires had been set that morning in her school. As before, school officials had themselves extinguished the fires and had not contacted the fire department. Unlike the administrators at Kid City, they had not learned the most important lesson about fire, one I believe should be engraved in giant letters for all to see:

THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A SMALL FIRE. THERE ARE ONLY FIRES THAT HAVE NOT GOTTEN BIG—YET.

Shelly Reuben King is the author of Tabula Rasa, Origin & Cause, Spent Matches, the Edgar-nominated Julian Solo, and Weeping. She is a licensed private detective and a certified fire investigator who has been investigating fires and arson for more than 20 years. King is a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners and has been a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners since 1996.

Forensic Engineering Evaluation of Premises Maintenance

Forensic Engineering Evaluation of Premises Maintenance

Abstract

A premises (building and its site) consists of components to form a safe, usable facility. The components must be maintained in order to keep them functioning. Forensic engineers are often asked to render their opinions concerning a component’s performance and the maintenance it has received. Because the results are to be used in a forensic forum, the engineer must have a well-documented methodology and a firm basis for his or her opinions. One method of making such an evaluation is to employ a systems approach.

When a component and its maintenance are treated as a system, the engineer considers its various aspects and the interaction between those aspects. Furthermore, the examiner can test “what if” hypotheses using the same method. This article discusses a method to achieve that end while giving the forensic engineer a strong foundation for his or her opinion.

THE FORENSIC EXAMINER Fall 2007

Fall 2007 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER

This article is approved by the following for continuing education credit:

(ACFEI) The American College of Forensic Examiners International provides this continuing education credit for Diplomates.

By John A. D’Onofrio, MS, CE, PE, DABFE, DABFET, DNAFE

Key Words: buildings, premises, maintenance, systems evaluation

Introduction

A premises (buildings and its site) consists of a group of systems working together to form a facility. The components of these systems must be maintained in order to keep them functioning. Following an accident or system failure, a forensic engineer is often asked to make an examination and render an opinion concerning a component’s performance and the maintenance it received. Such requests are most common in civil litigation, but may be required in a criminal case as well. Because of the complexity of a premises (both the building and its site), such services may be requested from engineers in many disciplines and some examinations may require an interdisciplinary team. Because the result is to be used in a forensic forum, the engineer must have a well-documented methodology and a firm basis for his or her opinions.

One method to make such an evaluation is to employ a systems approach. System analysis, as defined in this article, is the critical examination of the technical and managerial skills used to maintain the premises. This approach recognizes that continued, acceptable operation of a component is dependent upon a system consisting of the component itself and the maintenance it receives. Systems, whether including human activity or not, are subject to limitations whose effects can best be understood through system analysis. Furthermore, the examiner can test “what if” hypotheses by assuming changes in the system and analyzing the results. The result of an analysis is a simple statement of opinion; however, time, work, and data are needed to posit an opinion with a strong foundation.

The remainder of this article discusses a method to achieve that end. Many of the principles discussed have their origin in health and safety engineering. Often, premises maintenance evaluations are required when an accident or injury has occurred. Therefore, the method described here is closely related to safety engineering practice.

The Flow Chart (Figure 1)

By applying the evaulation flow chart, the examiner covers a wide range of pertinent topics. Not only does this provide a guideline to the examination, but it also provides an excellent foundation for the engineer’s opinions. The flow chart has two flow paths, Component and Maintenance. Each path consists of decision points where the engineer finds the aspect under consideration either acceptable (yes) or unacceptable (no). A “no” evaluation leads to an Inadequate System rating. A series of “yes” evaluations leads to the And gate toward the bottom of the flow chart. Both paths of the flowchart must be evaluated and lead to the And gate in order for the system to receive a Good rating. If the first path leads to the And gate, then the second path must be evaluated to complete the process.

Once an Inadequate System rating is reached, theoretically, there is no need for further evaluation. However, an Inadequate System rating is often the beginning of the next phase of the investigation, an explanation of cause. Because a system may be inadequate for numerous causes, the engineer alone must decide whether he or she should continue the evaluation further.

An Example

The following example follows Figure 1 and includes a discussion of the evaluation process. The example is a request to evaluate the floor of a small mercantile establishment where a patron slipped and fell on a rainy day. There is an allegation that water was present on the floor at the time of this fall. The component to be evaluated is the flooring. The maintenance program is that which the proprietor uses for safety during inclement weather.

Operating Conditions

The first step in the evaluation process is to determine the operating conditions. These are the conditions under which the system is expected to operate and give the engineer insight to the system when working the evaluation paths.

The operating conditions are best determined by site inspection, document review, and testimony of various parties. A document review may include but is not limited to:

• Plans and specifications prepared by the building architect or design engineer
• Lease documents that may specify permitted activities within the building
• Building and maintenance codes
• Zoning ordinances and other regulatory documents
• Indoor environmental standards common to the industry

In this example, the site inspection revealed that the space was being used as a haberdashery. Flooring was a commercial grade vinyl tile. The slip location was approximately 7 feet from the entry. The document review has determined that, at the time of the fall, the building was approximately 25 years old. The architect’s plans indicate the space to be used for retail use. The use of the space for mercantile purposes is consistent with the permitted uses in the zoning ordinance. The lease between the owner and tenant indicates that the space is to be used for the legal, retail sale of goods, not to include food or personal services. Based on the site inspection and document review the engineer can reasonably conclude that the use of the space is “anticipated.”

Note from Figure 1 that the evaluation process does not depend upon the operating conditions; however, if unanticipated conditions are involved, the examiner must decide and note if the evaluation is made for the actual conditions encountered, the anticipated conditions, or both. The examiner must also recognize that a component may be exposed to an unanticipated condition and continue to function well.

Component

Component evaluation follows the right side of Figure 1. Here, the specific component under examination is scrutinized under the chosen operating conditions.

Component Specifications. The next step in component evaluation is to determine if it meets specification. This step implies that the engineer has determined the component’s specification and an appropriate test for compliance. The component specification may be either specific (specified by size, make, and model) or performance (i.e. 100 cfm fan, 230VA) oriented. Oftentimes, component specifications are not specific and must be derived from document review. These include, but are not limited to:

• Plans and specifications prepared by the building architect or design engineer
• Manufacturer’s specifications
• Building codes
• Typical architectural and engineering details (graphic standards)
• Engineering organization standards
• Authoritative consensus standards

In the example, the architectural plans were silent on the flooring material. According to testimony, the vinyl tile was selected by the owner and was in place when the tenant moved in. The manufacturer is unknown at this time. The tenant space was inspected by the construction official before opening to the public and received a certificate of occupancy. The local building code requires that all walking surfaces be slip-resistant.

A literature search revealed an ASTM standard that relates slip resistance to the floor’s static coefficient of friction with a shoe-leather test surface and a threshold level. On-site testing of the floor material was conducted and determined it to be slip-resistant.

Based on the site inspection, document review, and testing, the engineer can reasonably conclude that the material used to construct the floor surface meets specification.

Component Installation. The next step in Figure 1 is to examine the component installation. Poor workmanship should be noted and described. The manufacturer’s installation guide for the component should be consulted, if possible, whenever installation is drawn into question. In the example, the vinyl tile was examined and found to be tight, stable, and planar. Based on the site inspection, the engineer was able to reasonably conclude that the installation was not an issue and probably followed the manufacturer’s specification.

Maintenance

The maintenance flow path follows the left side of Figure 1. Here, the maintenance program under examination is scrutinized under the chosen operating conditions. This flow path incorporates work on safety done in the United States and the United Kingdom. The U.S. recommendations were developed and promulgated for workplace safety. The U.S. Department of Labor, through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), publishes a document entitled Keeping Your Workplace Safe (1999). This document describes four elements that every effective program should have:

• Management, leadership, and employee involvement
• Workplace analysis
• Hazard prevention and control
• Training and education

Similarly, the Health and Safety Executive of the United Kingdom publishes a document entitled Managing Health and Safety – Five Steps to Success (1998). The document states: “This leaflet contains notes on good practice which are not compulsory, but which you may find helpful in considering what you need to do.” The five steps are

• set up your policy;
• organize your staff;
• plan and set standards;
• measure your performance;
• learn from experience.

Figure 1 incorporates these into the four aspects of the maintenance procedure flow path.

Maintenance Procedure

Maintenance procedures may be written and formalized. This is commonly found at locations that have a maintenance department or are part of a nationally operated or franchised establishment. Managers responsible for large buildings or multiple premises may have routine and preventative maintenance scheduled and noted by computer. On the other side of the spectrum, other business or industrial locations may not have a written plan, and the examiner must determine the maintenance procedure through investigation, interview, or testimony.

The second aspect of the maintenance procedure is to determine if it conforms to or follows a standard. The examiner must keep an open mind and not judge the book by its cover. Policies and procedures that are extensive, written, and neatly bound are not necessarily more compliant with standards than those that are less organized. A lack of organization and record-keeping may be a regulatory violation, but is insufficient by itself to consider the system inadequate. However, policies and procedures that are unclear may be considered outside the standards because of ambiguity. Further, loosely stated maintenance procedures can have an effect on other aspects of the maintenance program.

The engineer must determine the appropriate standard by which to measure the subject procedure. The manufacturer’s specification on how to maintain the component should be investigated and may specify a performance standard for maintenance. For example, certain filters may need to be checked at a maximum time interval and cleaned following a specified process. Property maintenance regulation may specify the maximum time that snow or ice may be allowed to remain untreated or the length of time that rainwater may accumulate before it is considered stagnant.

In cases where the standard is not straightforward, the engineer must be prepared to ascertain industry standards for maintenance based on authoritative and circulated industry publications. Standards organizations such as the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) publish a wealth of information. The insurance industry has a long history of underwriting standards for buildings and sites. They pioneered sprinkler system standards for fire control, and many insurance companies sponsor safety research to this day. Over time, these findings become industry standards and find their way into loss-control and underwriting literature. The National Safety Council (NSC) and the American Society of Safety Engineers (ASEE) are another source of information. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force have extensive procedures for maintaining buildings and sites with a wealth of information available on their websites (Secretary, 2004; U.S. Army, 2003).

When deciding on an appropriate standard, the examiner must be sure that the standard is widely circulated and does not conflict with jurisdictional building codes, maintenance regulations, or site improvement standards. The challenge is to determine reasonable industry standards for a given situation, especially in view of critics that are always present around any issue. Cutting-edge academic and scientific papers should be used with caution. They may be useful to explain or substantiate a principle, but most are not widely circulated amongst maintenance practitioners, and the author’s view may not be widely accepted or adopted as a standard.

When researching standards, remember that a maintenance procedure in practice must include a method of discovering conditions that need to be maintained. Discovery of a condition that has developed relative to a component is an essential part of maintenance. The time required to correct such conditions (correction time) includes both the amount of time the condition exists before it is discovered (discovery time) and the amount of time required to do the work using reasonable dispatch (work time). Hence, there will always be a time interval between the instant a component develops a condition requiring work and when the work is completed. Often a condition that develops will not be obvious and the maintenance procedure must be proactive to minimize the discovery time. For example, mechanical equipment should be checked on a periodic basis to assure it is either functioning properly or exhibiting telltale signs of impending failure.

Published standards must also be read with this principle in mind. They will often indicate that certain actions must be taken “immediately.” This should be interpreted as acting “without delay upon discovery” because instantaneous discovery (zero discovery time) and correction (zero work time) is, in most cases, impossible.

The procedure and standard examination may require some iteration. The examiner should have the standard in mind when examining the procedure and the procedure in mind when examining the standard. After interviewing the various parties or reviewing their deposition testimony, review both the procedure and the standard for modifications afterward. This will help assure that nothing out of the ordinary is missed.

In the example, the engineer researched Best’s Loss Control Manual (2000), a loss-control engineering guide and authoritative publication for insurance underwriting. After selecting the appropriate use, he reviewed the various items of concern and selected those that were appropriate to floor maintenance and the conditions at hand. This subset of conditions became the performance standard for the evaluation. Also, it was determined that local building and maintenance codes provided no performance standard for floor maintenance. Further review of a NSC publication concerning falls on floors revealed similar recommendations therein. The engineer felt confident that the items selected represented good practice and industry standard.

The maintenance procedures for floor maintenance were written and posted on the bulletin board in the employee area of the store along with emergency phone numbers. While not detailed, they covered the items in the standard and were straightforward and easy to understand. They included employee assignments and response measures to inclement weather conditions. The engineer determined that the maintenance procedure did follow standard.

Education

Education refers to the training that maintenance personnel receive. Depending upon the maintenance tasks, the education may require specialized training or schooling. Most commonly, however, maintenance personnel receive on-the-job training, especially if the maintenance tasks are more janitorial than repair in nature. Management must be involved to assure that education is not a one-time experience. New equipment or changes in business operations may require re-training of maintenance personnel. Further, it must also be determined that the specific personnel responsible for the maintenance had received the training and understood their duty. Maintenance personnel must be taught and encouraged to trust their judgment and report their opinions concerning the component or the maintenance procedure to management without fear of reprisal.

In the example, it was determined that all employees are instructed as to the safety procedures for inclement weather. The maintenance was basically a janitorial function. Safety posters were on the employee bulletin board, and the owner discussed safety at all employee meetings, instructing them to place mats on the floors and warning cones at the entrance when it starts to rain. Employees were instructed how to properly clean water and spills from the floor and to watch for such conditions as they move about the store. The specific employee at the store when the incident occurred had 3 years of experience with the company and was thoroughly familiar with the procedures. The engineer concluded that the personnel were sufficiently trained to properly maintain the floor.

Management

Management works hand-in-hand with education and is a critical component in resources. Management must consider maintenance a priority aspect of their business and be committed to keeping the system working. The attitude of management influences the personnel; if the boss does not care, neither will the staff. Management should

• have a system of reporting and tracking maintenance functions. This data can point to problems and the need for improvement in the system;
• check to assure that adequate resources in the form of manpower and equipment are available to keep the system running;
• reinforce education amongst the workers;
• create a climate where maintenance is a priority.

Sometimes an evaluation of management can be simple and straightforward. In other situations, it can be complex and difficult. A proprietor of a space that ships and receives merchandise from one or two loading docks may have no problem both scheduling and managing his truck traffic. The traffic manager for an industrial or warehouse operation may have traffic engineering and safety problems to be solved while, at the same time, keeping the system running. It is important that the examiner keep his own house in order and recognize when a consultant or team approach is required.

The proprietor of the establishment in the example had two locations to manage. He visited both of them more than five times a week and had constant cell-phone contact whenever the stores were open for business. He met with employees and conversed with each one every 2 weeks. Premises maintenance was always discussed. Furthermore, he rotated and replaced the signs, posters, and instructions posted in the employee areas. Based on this testimony, the engineer concluded that the management of the system is adequate.

Resources

Resources are the manpower, equipment, and material required to keep the maintenance program working. It is tied to management because management allocates the funds, hires the people, and sets the work schedules. Management also determines how and when the resources are allocated. Personnel view resources as a management statement, equating adequate allocation of resources to a top management priority. Conversely, management that is perceived as “doing-it-on-the-cheap” is considered to have maintenance as a low priority.

Although budgets are an important factor in any business, resources are best measured by what takes place at the premises. It is one thing to budget for an adequate number of filters and another thing to have them in the supply room when they are needed. It is one thing to budget for a snow removal contractor and another thing to have sufficient manpower to do the job properly. Therefore, resources are a topic of investigation with both management and the personnel at the site.

At many small premises, maintenance responsibilities are shared amongst the general staff. Workers in a machine shop may also do regular maintenance on the machines and pitch in for janitorial work. At large premises, there will be a maintenance department. Each can be satisfactory, and each presents challenges to the examiner. Staffing levels will vary from place to place, and the examiner will often rely on management testimony concerning overall staffing levels. However, the examiner needs to assure him or herself that there is adequate manpower to maintain the component under consideration. In any examination, testimony from the personnel specifically assigned to the component’s maintenance will be valuable. This is another area where the examiner may need input from a consultant.

Communication is another resource. At small premises, a few employees can respond quickly when a condition arises based on verbal communications. Larger premises may require radio or telephone communication systems to report a condition when it is discovered and to dispatch personnel to do the work.

The engineer must keep in mind that a maintenance evaluation of a particular building component is not an examination of the entire building. If the examiner fails to properly limit his investigation, he runs the risk of following many irrelevant paths at a cost of much time and effort. He also exposes himself to irrelevant information that clouds his judgment. This leaves the engineer open to charges of bias or “witch-hunting.”

In the example, the proprietor scheduled a minimum of two employees on each shift, one for general operations and one at the cash register. The retail space is not large and the operations employee were easily able to make half-hour inspection rounds. Furthermore, he observed the store while moving about and assisting customers and responded to instructions from the cash register station by a hand-held radio. Floor mats, warning signs, mops, and buckets were kept in the maintenance closet. Floor mats were serviced by an outside contractor every 2 months. Three mops and buckets were available—one for each employee and a spare.

Based on the site inspection and testimony from the various parties, the engineer concluded that the system was supported by sufficient resources to properly maintain the floor during wet weather. This results in a “yes” for resources.

However, during his examination the engineer discovered that one employee was sick the day of the incident, leaving only one person to man both the cash register station and cover general operations. There was no one else available to cover the shift. When the rain started he placed the mats and warning signs at the entrance. However, he was unable to make regular rounds of the store looking for water and spills on the floor. The water on the floor was brought to his attention when the patron fell.

Opinions and Conclusions

According to the flow chart, when there are two “yes” results at the And gate, the engineer can feel confident that the component is adequate and the maintenance system can keep it functioning properly under the expected operating conditions. Therefore, a Good System rating is in order.

The fact that a component has failed does not affect this rating; it is the system being evaluated and not a single event. Components and maintenance can fail, even in a good system, because all systems have limitations; they are subject to randomly occurring and unpredictable events.

In the floor accident example, the system recieved a Good rating. However, insight into the event under consideration was gained by analyzing the conditions at the time of the failure. A re-analysis using the staffing conditions on the day of the component failure resulted in a “no” (not adequate) classification for resources because staffing fell below management’s recommended levels, and proper inspections were not taking place because of the short-staffing condition. Under these conditions, the flow chart leads to an Inadequate System rating for that particular circumstance. The forensic engineer must clearly make the distinction between the system’s rating overall and its rating as operating at a particular time. This distinction can be important in a forensic forum.

The use of systems analysis, as presented here, offers the forensic engineer a methodology of evaluation that is both comprehensive and flexible. The example presented shows that the method has application to simple as well as complex systems. The engineer must remember that the analysis is only as good as the input data, the end result is the opinion of an engineer who may have to defend it, and this analysis and opinion are seldom the end of the questions to be answered.

References

A. M. Best Company, Inc. (2000). Best’s loss control manual (version 2006). Oldwick, NJ: Author.

Brauer, R. L. (1990). Safety and health for engineers. New York: VanNostrand Reinhold.

Health and Safety Executive Books. (1998). Managing health and safety—Five steps to success. United Kingdom: Author.

Secretary of the Air Force. (2004). Safety and health standards. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (2003). Safety and health requirements manual. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of Labor. (1999). Keeping your workplace safe. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Wausau Insurance Company. (1990). Hazard survey guide. Wausea, MN: Author.

About the Author

John A. D’Onofrio, MS, CE, PE, is a professional engineer in private practice with more than 30 years experience in the engineering design and forensic evaluation of buildings and premises. He holds a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree in civil engineering from the New Jersey Institute of Technology. D’Onofrio is a licensed professional engineer in New York, New Jersey, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and has been recognized as an expert in federal court and in the courts of all three states. He has taught at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey, and at the Community College of Morris in Randolph, New Jersey. He has been a guest lecturer before the New Jersey Municipal Engineer’s Foundation and the New Jersey Society of Professional Land Surveyors.

This article published by Dr. O’Block

Inside the Mind of the Mind Hunter: an Interview With Legendary Fbi Agent John Douglas

You are well known for your exceptional career in criminal profiling. Please tell our readers about your background and how you became a famous FBI profiler.


As a child I watched a popular television show called The FBI starring Efrem Zimbalist Jr. who played the part of Inspector Erskine. This show was on television for 9 years (1965–74) and had 240 episodes based on the work of the Inspector Erskine, who was all business. He didn’t laugh, didn’t love, and didn’t play. He worked every type of case and flew in a private jet to wherever the action was. In truth, this position was non-existent. A FBI agent was, and still is, assigned to 1 of 59 field offices and generally remains in that office unless transferred. Little did I know in 1970 when I joined the FBI, that one day I would actually create a position within the FBI based on Inspector Erskine that would have me traveling throughout the United States and abroad providing on-site consultations in the form of crime analysis and criminal profiling.


As a young FBI agent I enjoyed investigations that included interpersonal violence, cases where the subjects were attempting to avoid prosecution or confinement, and cases where the subjects were fugitives from justice. While the investigations and arrests were fun, I was really interested in learning something about who they were and why they perpetrated their crimes, particularly violent crimes, against innocent people.


Along the way I obtained graduate degrees in educational psychology, guidance and counseling, and adult education. I enrolled in many abnormal and clinical psychology courses, but while I found the classes interesting, they never really addressed the question of motive. Perhaps because the professors teaching those courses had little, if any, experience with the criminal element.


In 1977 when I was promoted and transferred to the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI Academy, I hoped I would learn more about the motives behind criminal behavior. The students (law enforcement officers enrolled in the criminal psychology classes taught at the FBI Academy) and I found the classes entertaining and sometimes humorous, and the instructors received the highest praises each semester from their students. Yet, I still felt there was something missing. None of these instructors had actually gone into prisons and personally asked violent offenders about the specifics of their crimes. I wanted to know about pre-offense behavior, victim selection, the offender’s personal background, their motivation, their post offense behavior, and how they were identified and apply that information to present-day cases.


By the early 1980s, another colleague and I received a federal grant to conduct research on serial murderers. It seemed obvious to me that to learn from the “experts,” it is necessary to speak with them. My personal mantra in all of my books has always been the following:


“To understand the artist, look at the art work.”


“Behavior reflects personality.”


“The crime is a reflection of the offender.”


The above seemed so obvious that I was surprised and somewhat amused when some people and organizations began praising this enlightenment into the criminal mind. However, not everyone praised my ideas. Individuals in mental health, probation and parole, and corrections did not like what I was advocating. In sum, all I said was that anyone in such positions of responsibility must not base their findings and conclusions on an offender’s self-reporting. The interview is only one piece of the puzzle. The criminal case, which includes analyzing the complete crime scene and autopsy photos (in the case of a homicide); the autopsy protocol; and law enforcement preliminary reports must all be reviewed, and how the offenders were apprehended must be determined. Relying on self-reporting alone is a disservice to the criminal justice system and threatens those who want to live and work in a safe community.


A few years ago on a book tour in New Zealand, I spoke before a group of psychologists and psychiatrists at their institution for the criminally insane. Before I began my lecture I could tell by their body language that they had a problem with me. Apparently, they had read some of my books where I criticized making evaluations of an inmate without ever looking at the facts of the case. Their response to me was that by looking at the crime scene photos or reading preliminary police reports they would unfairly pre-judge the patient/inmate. I responded by saying that if you don’t take time to look at those types of case information then they, as mental health professionals, would have no idea to whom they were talking. I told them they cannot and should not rely on self-reporting alone because the bad guys lie. They may not have liked what I said, but that is the truth based on my own experiences.


During the span of your career, the progression of criminal profiling made vast advancements. Can you describe your position as an FBI profiler and your role in implementing the expansion of this field?


In 1977, when I was transferred to the FBI Academy as a criminal psychology instructor, the criminal profiler position did not exist. After first conducting the research and then passing on what I learned in classes, we began to receive cases for analysis. Starting in 1981 I began creating a criminal profiling program within the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit. During the first year we received approximately 54 cases and every subsequent year the caseload expanded. By the time I retired from the FBI in 1995, we were analyzing over 1,000 cases a year. When I retired I had 43 employees in my unit. Only 12 of those employees profiled, so it was very stressful for all of us. We had to deal with life and death situations with very short deadlines.


Even today, there are many people who think the FBI only profiles serial murder cases. In reality, the majority of cases are single homicides, and every type of violent crime has been researched and analyzed by profilers.


Profiling is not the only investigative tool available. For example, there are some cases where profiling an unknown offender would not be suitable because of the high risk-level of the victim. What could possibly still be provided are proactive techniques, research-based probable cause for search warrants, interview and interrogation techniques, prosecution and defense counseling, and possibly expert testimony.


Criminal profiling is a rough line of work. Please describe some of the more difficult aspects of the job.


The very nature of profiling violent crimes makes for a highly stressful job. One must be able to identify with both the subject and victim in order to answer the investigative formula of why + how = who.


It has been my experience that if a profiler uses the defense mechanism of “isolation of affect” they will not be successful. When I train profilers I tell them they must walk in the shoes of both the subject and victim. You have to experience the feelings and emotions of both.


There is danger in this technique. In 1983 I nearly died in Seattle, Washington, while working on the Green River murder case. I was found in my hotel room in a coma caused by a body temperature btween 104 and 107 degrees. After 5 days in a coma I woke up and found myself paralyzed on my left side. I had viral encephalitis and doctors attributed my weakened immune system to the amount of stress I was under. I was later treated for post-traumatic stress disorder.


Please describe the most fascinating case of which you have been a part.


There have been many interesting and personally rewarding cases in my career. Most recently I was able to interview Dennis Rader, the “BTK Strangler” whose murders resurfaced after 30 years. I did the original profile in 1979 and later updated it with my colleagues. I briefly wrote and profiled the BTK Strangler in my book Obsession. When I interviewed Rader he told me he read Obsession and personally critiqued my analysis. He said my analysis was very good, but his identification, arrest, and conviction were not attributed to it. In August 2007, Jossey-Bass will be publishing my book on the BTK and during the 2007 ACFEI National Conference I will be presenting this case along with many others.


What else can be learned from your seminars with ACFEI?


Profiling, in the right hands and with good training, can be a viable investigative tool. Those attending the seminar will have a better appreciation and understanding of the overall profiling process. Criminal profiling is not accurately portrayed in the movies and on television. Attendees will learn the process of criminal profiling, and I will demonstrate that criminal investigative analysis is very similar to a physician’s act of diagnosing a patient with an unknown illness or disease. Both the medical doctor and criminal profiler can be wrong at times. We are only as good as the information provided to us for analysis. Unfortunately, not every case investigated is a perfect one, but it is important to recognize the imperfections and consider them in the overall analysis.


ACFEI is made up of members from a wide array of forensic backgrounds. How does your presentation relate to all attendees’ professions?


In the past I’ve spoken to college students, physicians, lawyers, school teachers, nurses, stock brokers, sales personnel, and many other persons from a variety of occupations. At the very least the audience will be entertained in a forensic area with which most are not intimately familiar. Others will find that the seminar will have direct application to their forensic specialty. I hope that everyone attending the seminar will take the information provided, digest it, and then apply it, not only to their work, but also to their lives.